Course title	e: Microeconomics-II	_					
Course cod	e: MPE 137	No. of cr	edits: 3	L-T-P: 37-5-0	Lear	ning hour	:s: 42
Pre-requisite course code and title (if any): None							
Departmen	t: Department of Policy Studies						
Course coordinator: Dr. Soumendu Sarkar Course instructor Dr. Soumendu Sarkar							
Contact details: soumendu.sarkar@terisas.ac.in							
Course type: Elective Course offered in: Semester 4							
Course description:							
Standard Microeconomics deals with market structure under rationality of individuals, certainty of outcomes and full							
information. This course attempts to explore challenges to the economic theorist when such assumptions break							
down. It explores institutions like insurance, contracts, law, elections, auctions and matching.							
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Course objectives:							
This course aims to provide the student with understanding of different market and non-market mechanisms of							
anocation, t	nen advantages and pittans.						
Course con	tents						
S No					T	Т	р
1	Module 1. Flashback and Overv	iew			1	1	1
1	Recan of standard Microeconomi	ic theory:			1		
	individual decision-making and ge	neral					
	equilibrium						
	• Overview of the course						
2	Module 2: An uncertain world				7	1	
	• Expected Utility Theorem, Measured	asures of Risk Aversion; Insurance; General					
	Equilibrium under uncertainty; Asset Markets						
3	Module 3: Lemons and Shirking				7	1	
	Market for lemons; the screening problem						
	Moral hazard; optimal incentive schemes						
	Job market Signalling						
	• Applications: industrial regulation, underdeveloped agriculture etc.						
4	Module 4: Law and Economics				3		
	• Coase and Transaction Cost appr	oach					
5	Brief overview of law and economics						
3	• A garagetion of individual profess	social choic	æ		0		
	• Aggregation of individual prefere	rem					
	Strategic Social Choice: Gibbard.	-Satterthwai	ite				
	Theorem: Nash Implementation						
6	Module 6: Design your own mar	ket			7	2	
	• Mechanism design with money: Optimal auction, VCG, double auctions					-	
	Mechanism design without money: marriage market and the Gale-Shapley						
	algorithm; house allocation problem and the Shapley-Scarf algorithm						
	• Applications: Spectrum auctions, coal auctions, school choice, kidney						
	exchange			•			
7	Module 7: Cooperative Games an	nd Networl	ks		6	1	
	• Bargaining Solutions: Nash solution, Core and Shapley Value;						1
	• Economics of social networks: stability vs efficiency, network formation						
	games.						
	Total				37	5	

Evaluation criteria:

1. Term Paper

2. Major Examination (written) 50 %

Learning outcomes:

On completion of this course, the students would:

- 1. Know about advantages and limitations of different market and non-market systems of allocation
- 2. Be able to construct and solve simple models of market imperfections

50%

Pedagogical approach:

Standard classroom teaching followed by problem solving sessions

Materials:

Suggested readings

Required:

- 1. Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael Dennis Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic theory. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford university press, 1995.
- 3. Bergin, James. Microeconomic theory: a concise course. Oxford University Press, 2005.

Additional:

- 1. LeRoy, Stephen F., and Jan Werner. Principles of financial economics. Cambridge UniversityPress, 2001.
- 2. Salanié, Bernard. The economics of contracts: a primer. MIT press, 2005.
- 3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort. The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model.
- Princeton University Press, 2009.4. Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract theory. MIT press, 2005. 5. Coase, Ronald Harry. The firm, the market, and the law. University of Chicago press, 2012.
- Gaertner, Wulf. A Primer in Social Choice Theory: Revised Edition: Revised Edition. Oxford University Press, 2009.
- 7. http://alsamixer.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/iisclectures2.pdf
- 8. Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
- 9. Peleg, Bezalel, and Peter Sudhölter. Introduction to the theory of cooperative games. Vol. 34.Springer, 2007.
- 10. Goyal, Sanjeev. Connections: an introduction to the economics of networks. Princeton University Press, 2012.

Additional information (if any):

Student responsibilities: Attendance, feedback, discipline: as per university rules.

Course reviewers:

This course was reviewed by

- 1. Prof Debasis Mishra, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi
- 2. Prof Priyodarshi Banerjee, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata